DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL PVE STRATEGYAND ACTION PLAN FOR LIBYA

FINAL PROJECT REPORT
NOVEMBER 2021 TO DECEMBER 2022

PROJECT INFORMATION

Donor:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands
Project ID:	00129361
Project Name:	Development of a National PVE Strategy and Action Plan for Libya
Project Duration:	1st Nov 2021 – 31 July 2023
Total Project Budget:	USD 300,000
Implementing Partner(s):	United Nations Development Programme
Project Counterparts:	Libyan Counter Terrorism Centre
Project Objective:	The project's objective was to enable Libyan authorities to address the root causes and structural drivers of VE more effectively in the country. By adopting a cohesive, inclusive, and rights-based approach to PVE, the national government and other stakeholders would be able to enhance the population's resilience to VE and prevent its further spread, ultimately increasing stability and security in the country.
Project Outcomes:	Outcome 1: The Government of Libya has a consolidated National PVE Framework (strategy and implementable action plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research, and learning. Outcome 2: Municipalities in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework. Outcome 3: Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.

ACRONYMS

CO	Country Office
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Counter Terrorism
DDA	Dialogue and Debate Association
DDO	Dialogue and Debate Organization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
GoL	Government of Libya
LAC	Local Advisory Committees
LCDHR	Libyan Centre for Democracy and Human Rights
LCTC	Libyan Counter Terrorism Centre
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoL	Ministry of Labour
MoWA	Ministry of Women Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PCVE	Prevention and Counter Violent Extremism
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
SUSC	Stability, Unity, and Social Cohesion Project
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The political and socio-economic structural challenges plaguing Libya since 2011 have established a favourable environment for the development of violent extremist (VE) groups and organized criminal gangs, who present a persisting threat to the everyday security of the Libyan people. VE groups will likely continue to pose a challenge to the country's stability while the underlying, multi-faceted drivers of radicalization and recruitment into VE groups remain unaddressed. Within this context, the Libyan Counter Terrorism Centre (LCTC) invited UNDP Libya to support the expansion of the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) component of its Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy, which was created in 2020. As such, this project was aimed at deepening this partnership and supporting the Government of Libya (GoL) to develop a comprehensive national PVE framework (i.e., strategy and accompanying action plan), in addition to a coordination mechanism that links the PVE framework at the national level with its corresponding and complementary components at the local level. The project's overall objective was to enable Libyan authorities to address the root causes and structural drivers of VE more effectively in the country. By adopting a cohesive, inclusive, and rights-based approach to PVE, the national government and other stakeholders would be able to enhance the population's resilience to VE and prevent its further spread, ultimately increasing stability and security in the country.

During the reporting period, the UNDP PVE Technical Expert conducted a desk review of the Libyan Counter Terrorism Strategy (November 2020) specifically Pillar IV, which is the PVE component. The main objective of this review was to ascertain the type and level of technical support that UNDP can provide the Government of Libya (GoL) to help develop its PVE strategy. This involved several consultations with key stakeholders in the GoL such as: (i) the LCTC; (ii) the Ministry of Labour – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (MoL-DDR) Unit; (iii) the Ministry of Education (MoE); (iv) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA); and (v) the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA). During the review it became evident that although the military and security apparatus developed the CT strategy, its prevention and protection pillar should be done using a soft approach, i.e., a whole of government and whole of society approach. Definitions of important terms such as 'radicalization,' 'extremism,' 'violent extremism,' 'PVE,' 'CVE,' and 'counter terrorism' should be taken into careful consideration as the Libyan perception of such words/ terms is more important that the actual and literal meaning themselves. In addition, the planned results stated under the CT prevention and protection pillars were also insufficient since crucial elements like rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent extremist convicts and/ or their families were disregarded. not to mention neglecting to create referral mechanism for individuals at VE risk.

Critical PVE stakeholders were identified during the reporting period and included nine (9) line ministries, seven (7) municipalities, seven (7) Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and several PVE experts from Libya, the region, and from around the world. These key players helped to provide insights on global trends in PVE and how PVE can be practically applied to the Libyan context. These consultations were done bilaterally, in various fora such as the 'Launch event of the PVE Report', the 'Emerging Trends in Violent Extremism and the Future of PVE in Libya' conference, and during the implementation of the European Union (EU) funded Stability, Unity, and Social Cohesion – Prevention of Violent Extremism (SUSC - PVE) project (i.e., the three pilot projects in the seven target municipalities). The PVE Technical Expert played a critical role in these activities, which enabled him to finalize the Inception report. The Inception report outlined the methodology to be used for the development

of the national PVE strategy and action plan for Libya, and includes the required tools, measures, processes for national and local stakeholder participation, as well as a detailed workplan and delivery. The Inception report covered six (6) fundamental areas, specifically: (i) P/CVE development Methodologies and approaches; (ii) P/CVE development process; (iii) National and International P/CVE coordination mechanisms; (iv) Changes; (v) P/CVE development detailed timeline; and (vi) Risks. The Inception report provided the framework for the National PVE Strategy whose main objective is to strengthen the capabilities of the Libyan state while in parallel actively increase societal cohesion and resilience.

The methodology for preparing the National PVE framework is based on interaction and integration between three main pillars, which aree: (i) strengthening of the state; (ii) enhancing social cohesion and resilience; and (iii) peace-building efforts in Libya. In addition to this, the following steps were identified as critical: (1) Preparation Phase: formation of a national team to enhance social cohesion and resilience and represent the whole of government and whole of society approach while building the capacity of this national team (i.e., in the field of P/CVE); (2) Framework Development Phase: includes developing the strategic vison and mission statements, defining priority thematic areas, classifying the thematic areas into three categories: (general, specific, and targeted prevention). (3) The Framework Implementation Plan Phase: defining the current actions and procedures against each output and any additional procedures; and (3) Framework Governance Phase: includes defining an annual review of the framework, preparing a quarterly report on the progress made in implementing the framework and developing a strategic communication plan around the framework.

During the reporting period, the project provided support to a total of 51 GoL PVE stakeholders who were primarily members of the LCTC and key focal points in the line ministries. This was complemented by PVE activities conducted under the EU funded SUSC project, which brought together three PVE experts (in the fields of peace education, peace messaging, and PVE cross border strategies) to work in tandem with the PVE Technical Expert. This collaborative framework helped in the creation of six (6) out of the planned seven (7)[1] Local Advisory Committees (LACs) in the target municipalities (i.e., Murzuq, Ghat, Sebha, Bani Walid, Misrata, and Zuwara). These LACs consisted of local community leaders, youths, minorities, and women who provided inputs for the development of municipal PVE strategies and action plans. The PVE Technical expert along with the EU funded PVE experts provided technical support (i.e., tools, guidance, and technical feedback) and capacity building to LAC members during this process. The TOR for the PVE Technical Working Group (WG) were developed, however, the WG could not be convened due to the GoL PVE interlocutor's objection to issues raised in the PVE report regarding the treatment of minorities in the south. Therefore, the implementation of the project was halted until these references were removed from the report. Moving forward, it would be advisable to consult with other stakeholders within the GoL to ensure legitimate buy-in. Any future activities must be preceded with a sensitization process for the government so that there is consistency in their approach and engagement with UNDP. Relatedly, 28% of the total budget (i.e., $300,000) was utilized (i.e., $85,000) for the development of the strategy and for the required coordination.

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[1] Due to prevailing social and political challenges on the ground a LAC was not able to be established in AL Kufra

2. PROJECT BACKGROUND / CONTEXT

The political and socio-economic structural challenges plaguing Libya since 2011 have established a favourable environment for the development of violent extremist (VE) groups, who present a credible threat to the everyday security of the Libyan populace. VE groups will likely continue to pose a challenge to the country's stability while the underlying, multi-faceted drivers of radicalization and recruitment into VE groups remain unaddressed.

Within this context, the Libyan Counter Terrorism Centre (LCTC) invited UNDP Libya to support the expansion of the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) component of its Counterterrorism (CT) Strategy created in 2020. As such, this project was aimed at deepening this burgeoning partnership and supporting the Government of Libya to develop a comprehensive national PVE framework (strategy and accompanying action plan), in addition to a coordination mechanism to link the PVE framework at the national level with its corresponding and complementary components at the local level.

The project's objective was to enable Libyan authorities to address the root causes and structural drivers of VE more effectively in the country. By adopting a cohesive, inclusive, and rights-based approach to PVE, the national government and other stakeholders would be able to enhance the population's resilience to VE and prevent its further spread, ultimately increasing stability and security in the country.

The Project was built upon UNDP's ongoing PVE programming in Libya, which envisioned to feed into and support national-level efforts, as well as deploy UNDP's extensive technical subject matter expertise and experience to support national governments and communities to prevent VE in the region.

3. PROJECT RESULTS

Outcome Level Results

Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Results
Outcome 1: The Government of Libya has a consolidated National PVE Framework (strategy and implementable action plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research, and learning.			**Partially Achieved**
Comprehensive National PVE Framework developed (Action Plan and Strategy)	0	1 National PVE Strategy and Action Plan successfully developed	Achieved
# of human rights mechanisms or commitments mentioned and/or respected within the text of National PVE Framework	0	4	8
% of key national level PVE stakeholders who agree in end of project feedback survey that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory,' 'good,' or 'very good') support in the design of the National	0	Seventy percent agree	Achieved

Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Results
PVE Framework.			
% of key national level PVE stakeholders who agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory,' 'good,' or 'very good') support in the implementation of the National PVE Framework	0	Seventy percent agree	Strategy handed over to Libyan Counter Terrorism Authority for implementation
% of key national level PVE stakeholders who agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory,' 'good,' or 'very good') support in the monitoring and evaluation of the National PVE Framework	0	Seventy percent agree	Survey handed to LCTC for implementation
Outcome 2: Municipalities in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework.			**Partially Achieved**
Municipal PVE Framework developed (Action Plan and Strategy) in targeted municipalities	0	7	6 Achieved (except Al Kufra due to social and political challenges at the grass roots level)
% of key LAC stakeholders agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory,' 'good,' or 'very good') support in the design of their Municipal PVE Framework	0	Seventy percent agree	Survey handed to municipality for implementation
% of key LAC stakeholders agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory,' 'good,' or 'very good') support in the implementation of their Municipal PVE Framework	0	Seventy Percent agree	Survey handed to municipal focal points for implementation
Outcome 3: Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.			**Partially achieved**
The existence of an operational national-level PVE coordination mechanism (PVE WG)	0	Establishment of 1operational national- level PVE coordination mechanism	Enhanced collaboration (LCTC and line ministries)
% of national PVE WG members and observers that perceive this mechanism has supported the coordination of PVE efforts and framework implementation to 'some' or a great extent (end of project feedback survey)	0	Sixty percent agree	Collaborative framework established (LCTC, MoFA, MoL)
Coordination mechanisms facilitate information flows between national and local level actors	0	National and local level actors share information through the	LCTC regular communication with line ministries regarding PVE.

Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Results
		National PVE WG on aregular basis	
The existence of operational LACs in targeted municipalities	0	7	6 LACs operational (Al Kufra was not established)

Output Level Results

Output indicators	Data source	Baseline	Targets	Result
Output 1: National PVE Framework (Strategy and Action Plan) developed				
Desk review conducted on PVE in Libya, including an analysis of the PVE component of the CT Strategy (Activity 1.1)	Desk review document, project reports	0	1 Desk review	Achieved
Stakeholder mapping completed (Activity 1.1)	Stakeholder mapping document, Project reports	0	1 Stakeholder mapping	Achieved
Inception report completed (Activity 1.2)	Inception report document, Project reports	0	1 Inception report	Achieved
National PVE Strategy developed (Activity 1.3)	National PVE Strategy document, Project reports	0	1 National PVE Strategy	Achieved
National PVE Action Plan developed (Activity 1.3)	National PVE Strategy document, Project reports	0	1 National PVE Action Plan	Achieved
Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the design of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes - Technical support provided	Achieved
Technical support provided to key partners in the GOL in the implementation of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes – Technical support provided	National PVE Framework handed to LCTC for implementation

Output indicators	Data source	Baseline	Targets	Result
Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the monitoring and evaluation of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes – Technical support provided	National PVE Framework handed over to LCTC for monitoring and evaluation.
# of representatives from the LCTC and other key stakeholders who benefit from capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings) (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, attendance lists	0	20	51 focal points from the LCTC, GoL, line ministries, and municipalities attended key workshops sessions at Tunis conference.
Output 2: Local PVE Frameworks developed in participating municipalities				
# of LACs that develop municipal PVE strategies and/or action plans	Municipal PVE Framework documents; project reports	0	2 Municipal PVE strategies and/or action plans developed	6 Developed (AL Kufra not developed due to social and political challenges)
# of LACs that receive technical support, such as: tailored sessions with PVE experts, are provided with tools or guidance, and/or technical feedback on local PVE frameworks (Activity 2.1)	Project reports; key informant information	0	7	6 LACs provided with technical support by PVE experts except Al Kufra due to prevailing social and political environment
# of LACs whose members and other relevant local stakeholders benefit from capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings) (Activity 2.1)	Attendance lists; project reports; key informant information	0	7	6 LACs benefit from capacity building initiatives except Al Kufra due to prevailing social and political environment
Output 3: Coordination mechanisms linking PVE policies and activities at the national and local municipal levels developed				

Output indicators	Data source	Baseline	Targets	Result
Operational national- level PVE-WG established (Activity 3.1)	Project reports; key informant information, M&E report	0	1 operational national- level PVE WG established	There were no PVE Technical WG's that took place during the reporting period
	Attendance lists; project reports; key informant information	0	1 PVE-WG conducted with attendance lists of participants	There were no PVE Technical WG's that took place during the reporting period
# of key PVE stakeholders participating in PVE- WG (Activity 3.1)	Attendance lists; project reports; key informant information	0	None	There were no PVE Technical WG's that took place during the reporting period
# of LACs established (Activity 3.2)	Project reports; key informant information; M&E report	0	4	6 LACs established except in Al Kufra due prevailing social and political environment

4. PVE EXPERTS CONFERENCE ON LIBYA

Preceding the development of the strategy and action plan, the project supported the convening of a three-day meeting of PVE experts from around the world on Emerging Trends in Violent Extremism and the Future of PVE in Libya (10th to 12th October 2022), with a view to establish a collaborative framework of global experts that are interested in working on and in Libya.

The objectives of the conference were:

1. To provide a safe and secure platform for lessons learned and best practices to be shared and exchanged among international, national, and local PVE policy makers, practitioners, and academics.
2. To address major VE risks and their trends in Libya and its linkages to regional and global dynamics; to feed into the development of an evidence based PVE strategic framework.
3. To establish PVE community of practice in Libya.
4. To launch national, international, and local PVE technical working groups.

The discussion covered nine (9) thematic sessions which focused on current and previous practices, as well as remaining challenges in the field of PVE in the Libyan context. The respective thematic areas were: (i) Libya in context; (ii) Best practices in developing local and national PVE strategies; (iii) Critical challenges and risks to PVE policies and programming: (iv) Cultivating local and national ownership of PVE; (v) Roles of civil society in PVE; (vi) Local, national, and international coordination mechanisms; (vii) and PVE communication & media issues; (viii) Peace education programmes; and (ix) Women's roles in PVE.

In addition to the above-outlined thematic sessions, the third day of the conference was structured around interactive workshops focusing on: (i) Border Communities; (ii) Identification of the VE Threat in Libya; (iii) Current and Former Combatants; and (iv) Coordination Mechanisms.

Key observations and recommendations for the way forward include but were not limited to:

- Cross border dynamics should be tackled through both national and regional strategies, which comprise of a comprehensive approach that engages border security apparatus, local youths, women, and minorities (i.e., Peace Troika), local authorities, and the private sector.
- A securitized approach to counter terrorism has had unintended consequences and is potentially harmful. Accordingly, PVE should be separated from counter terrorism and a preventative development approach needs to be pursued with the focus on social cohesion and building resilience.
- A whole of society approach should be pursued and all the relevant actors should be included in the PVE strategy, including the private sector, the local community, the media (including social media), academia, and religious and community institutions.

The three-day conference also highlighted deficiencies and inequalities in service provision, including the availability of employment/ livelihood/ entrepreneurial opportunities and basic infrastructure, which are often the root causes of, and ultimately reinforce, grievances that are capitalized upon by VE and criminal organizations. If basic services are not sufficiently provided, VE and criminal organizations are incentivized to intervene and effectively 'fill the

void.' There needs to be an even distribution of development of local Infrastructure with equal access to all basic services guaranteed for all members of the local community (most especially for the vulnerable). Socio-economic reforms are crucial to tackling this issue.

The lack of religious education was also noted as a factor that can lead to violent extremism, and the lack of religious awareness is often exploited by VE groups during their recruitment campaigns. This is why there is a real need to invest in religious education that highlights the peaceful aspects of Islam and Christianity, and this should be made accessible to all members of target communities. Religious leaders play a pivotal role in Prevention and Counter Violent Extremism (PCVE) efforts, and they should be included in line with a whole-of society approach. Simultaneously, there is a need to denounce extremist and discriminatory language used by religious leaders while in parallel efforts should be made to audit and control extremist and discriminatory language and incitement of hatred by religious leaders, which will limit the momentum of those known to incite hatred and violent extremism.

Violent extremist indoctrination is absolute and implies that the ideology should not be discussed. In terms of countering VE narratives, directly confronting people that subscribe to VE ideologies while telling them that they are 'wrong' is not only an inefficient way of changing their minds, but also ineffective in the promotion of social diversity and social tolerance. Debate clubs and platforms are a more efficient way to promote dialogue and tolerance. The media plays an important part in P/ CVE efforts and should be used to create a culture of peace while also being used to distribute viral peace messages that are simple, dynamic, concrete, and credible. In parallel, social media should be monitored for the dissemination of 'hate speech' and the recruitment of operatives by VE groups.

There are various obstacles to the participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in PVE efforts as the growing importance of NGOs in the social fabric of Libya is a new phenomenon. It is important to note that there is a seeming discord between the State and civil society in Libya. The GoL needs to take the initiative in approaching and involving civil society, while the CSOs need to build their capacity to cooperate with each other.

During the conference it was also noted that Libyan women have been voicing their willingness to participate in PVE efforts (i.e., Peacebuilding), but they sometimes lack the platforms to do so and face various obstacles to public participation and inclusion in P/ CVE efforts. Women must be included in more active and crucial roles in policy making at all levels. Misogyny is both a gateway and an early warning sign of VE and VE organizations often strive to oppress women, which is usually at the core of their ideologies. Gender-based violence against women must be addressed as part of 'violent extremism' and within the scope of P/ CVE (where appropriate). P/CVE interventions need to be adequately monitored through gender-sensitive approaches, which can also be a donor requirement.

5. GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIFIC RESULTS

During the reporting period, the impact of organized crime and PVE on women – most especially in the southern borderlands of Libya – was highlighted during the implementation period. The project examined localized dynamics of VE recruitment, including relevant push and pull factors in the Libyan context, the distinct forms they have taken for youth, women, and minorities, and the role of Libya's governance vacuum in facilitating an enabling environment for violent extremist recruitment and transregional crime networks. Recruitment

strategies focus specifically on vulnerable women, such as those who struggle financially; widows; and divorced women. Vulnerable women are those most at risk of 'spinsterhood' (i.e., women who remain unmarried), which is particularly challenging within the context of Libya. In addition, sisters, wives, and daughters are easily recruited by virtue of subordination to their male relatives who belong to violent extremist groups.

A national PVE strategy within the Libyan context is peacebuilding, which includes improving respect for gender equality and human rights through monitoring of past and current violations and peace education. The strategy will also provide technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for a free media) and promoting conflict resolution techniques. In addition to this, peacebuilding includes, but is not limited to, the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society (i.e., a DDR programme), strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, including judicial and punitive reform), improving respect for human rights through the monitoring of past and current violations, through awareness raising campaigns, and by conducting fact finding investigations while providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for a free media).

A national PVE strategy also seeks to address the underlying conditions that lead to the spread of violent extremism by focusing on approaches that simultaneously respect human rights for all and the rule of law as a basis for stopping violent extremism – addressing the root causes and the motives for VE from spreading further. It is evident that a core part of the principles of developing a national PVE strategy relies on a human rights-based approach, the rule of law, and sustainable economic development in enhancing community cohesion and resilience at the local level. Awareness that any violations of human rights constitute a threat to peace and state-building efforts in Libya, and that achieving stability, development, and sustainable peace requires respect and protection of human rights as a first guarantee to address any social, political, economic, or cultural grievances, and to enhance social cohesion and resilience.

6. PARTNERSHIPS

The UNDP Libya Country Office (CO), through the National PVE Strategy and Action Plan project, provided support to the LCTC in the development of Pillar IV (i.e., PVE) of the Libyan Counter Terrorism Strategy. In addition, and in parallel with the Dutch funded PVE project, the EU funded Stability, Unity, and Social Cohesion – Prevention of Violent Extremism (SUSC-PVE) project supported the implementation of three pilot projects in the seven targeted municipalities, which were spearheaded by seven local CSOs (i.e., Life Makers, Alomobadr, TAVAT Cultural Media Foundation, Dialogue and Debate Association (DDA), Aman Organization, Libyan Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (LCDHR), and Dialogue and Debate Organization (DDO)).

This collaboration helped to further cement good relations with national and local authorities (i.e., focal points from the relevant line ministries and the target (7) municipalities), and local community, youth, and faith-based organizations on the ground in the target locations – effectively building a cohesive network of PVE actors who are engaged in many facets of their local communities. It is notable that this project brought together the EU and the Embassy of the Netherlands in a joint effort to shape PVE in Libya, which demonstrates the international community's commitment to foster stability, social cohesion, and sustainable economic development in Libya and the wider Sahel region. Libya represents an important and critical

hub in the wider Sahara/ Sahel region and is a gateway to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. For this reason, effective partnerships are not only inimical to fostering real collaboration within Libya but also between Libya and its immediate neighbours.

The convening of the three-day Emerging Trends in Violent Extremism and the Future of PVE in Libya conference also fostered the forming of a collaborative framework of global experts that are interested in working on and in Libya. Lessons learned and cumulative years of specialized experience were made available to the GoL PVE focal points, as well as the municipal representatives, and members of the CSOs who implemented the three pilot projects in the target municipalities. Such partnerships can and will be useful for any future endeavour involving Libya and the wider Sahel.

7. PROJECT CHALLENGES

During the launch of the EU funded PVE report (i.e., 3rd October 2022, Tripoli Libya) several ministries in attendance voiced their concerns and ultimate objection to some of the findings contained within the PVE report. Specifically, these findings include: (i) discrimination (of minorities); (ii) racism (i.e., towards populations in the southern borderlands); (iii) the non-issuance of IDs to certain communities (i.e., the Tebus and the Tuaregs); and (iv) gender equality/ women's rights (which has been erroneously conflated with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer - LGBTQ rights).

Despite providing UNDP Libya with a written endorsement of the PVE report on 23rd February 2022, the LCTC leadership claimed not to have known that the report contained such information and joined their colleagues from the ministries in calling for this information to be removed from the report. After subsequent meetings with the government, they insisted that unless the report was updated with the removal of the aforementioned information there would be no more activities under the PVE project. The planned five-day workshop, which was to take place during the last week of October 2022 was subsequently postponed until further notice.

To gather more clarification as to why these issues caused such an unexpected reaction from the LCTC and the relevant line ministries, the project team attended several meetings with the GoL PVE focal points. These meetings also provided an opportunity for the GoL PVE focal points to inform of future areas of cooperation with UNDP on related areas of interest.

Meeting with the LCTC
On 24th October 2022, UNDP met with the LCTC Head, General Mohamed Bashir Saleh, to discuss the EU funded PVE report, which was officially launched in Tripoli on 3rd October 2022. During the meeting, General Saleh praised the value of the report/ study, however, he expressed deep concerns about the way the report presented the findings regarding the links between VE and alleged discrimination of minorities in the south of Libya (i.e., the Tebu and Tuareg). This is even though UNDP shared the draft report with the LCTC leadership in November 2021 for review after which they provided UNDP with a written endorsement of the report with permission to publish on 24th February 2022. Nevertheless, during the meeting an agreement was reached that the UNDP PVE Technical Expert and an LCTC official (Mr. Omar Sewi) will meet to review the report and integrate the inputs from the GoL PVE focal points. Also discussed during the meeting was the proposed (but later postponed) 4-day

capacity building workshop on PVE, which was scheduled to take place in November 2022.

During the meeting, the LCTC focal points relayed their vision and priorities regarding community protection, cohesion, and PVE. General Saleh expressed his ongoing interest in working with UNDP on exploring future areas of collaboration and informed that he was 'ready to provide a proper platform/ space' to involve other key ministries in the development and implementation processes. UNDP presented the interest of the donor community in providing further support for Libya's peacebuilding efforts (especially involving border communities, rehabilitation, and reintegration). It also conveyed to LCTC that UNDP's peacebuilding programme is consistent with the interests of the GoL and the donors.

Meeting with MoL-DDR and MoFA

On 27th October 2022, UNDP met with the MoL-DDR focal point (Mr. Adel Alkarash) and two MoFA focal points from the International Cooperation Office. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the outcomes at the recently concluded 'Emerging Trends in Violent Extremism and the Future of PVE in Libya' conference (10th to 12th October 2022). Although the DDR focal point expressed reservations about some of the issues raised in the PVE report, he informed that he was ready to explore areas of cooperation between the MoL-DDR unit and UNDP in activities that fall under the general areas of peacebuilding and resilience, especially in the domain of strategic cross-border engagement. It is important to note that MoFA facilitated this meeting to discuss cooperation between UNDP and MoL (as well as other relevant ministries) in peace building and strategic cross-border initiatives. During the discussions, the MoL-DDR focal point stressed the clear correlation between PVE and DDR, which needs to be explored. He further called on UNDP to collaborate closely with the relevant national stakeholders to maintain the already ongoing partnership and momentum between UNDP, MoFA, and MoL. The MoL-DDR focal point requested UNDP's technical and programmatic expertise to support and build upon the ongoing 'National Project for Rehabilitation and Reintegration' initiatives. To provide the best possible support, the International Community will need to understand the following:

i.   The MoL-DDR focal point emphasized that previous international efforts failed in creating/ identifying the required DDR requirements due to the prevailing political and security situation in Libya and due to a lack of understanding regarding 'The Libyan modus operandi.' The MoL-DDR Focal Point informed UNDP about mechanisms to disarm light weapons that are currently undergoing legislative reviews, while the disarmament of heavy weapons requires international 'intervention' alongside 'one unified elected Libyan government.'

ii.   The MoL-DDR focal point emphasized the efforts from the '5+5 DDR Committee'. They stated that the MoL prefers to start with rehabilitation and reintegration before demobilization and disarmament. It is understood, therefore, that the 'current political situation and the fragile security status' in Libya has led to a broad consensus that national level 'social cohesion' remains a feasible pathway towards rehabilitation and reintegration until Libyans have the required capacity to perform full scale disarmament independent of any regional-international interventions.

iii. The MoL-DDR Focal Point further informed that the current DDR programme started as a 'Warriors Affairs Commission,' however, the aftermath of the 2011 revolution forced a change in their strategic approach into a 'Social Cohesion and Unity' and 'Peacebuilding' programme. Therefore, the MoL adopted a 'National Project for

Rehabilitation and Reintegration' as a strategic tool for repairing socio-political discord. It should be noted that this programme targets veterans and ex-militants with the aim of reintegrating them back into society so that they become effective citizens and part of the socio-economic-political transformation process towards one unified democratic Libyan State. Veterans and ex-militants are encouraged to apply through a MoL online portal as well as in person. Those that apply will be included within the programme's database. Then the process is divided into the following two stages:

a. **Rehabilitation**: This takes one year. Within the 1st quarter of the year the applicants will receive Psycho-social support after which they are divided into groups that usually consist of approx. 400 individuals. For those that suffered from drug abuse, addiction, and alcoholism will be given the appropriate treatment in a drug addiction Centre. During the second quarter follow-up and monitoring activities will be conducted where successful applicants will be moved into a six-month training and education stage.

b. **Reintegration**: In the second year after the successful rehabilitation process, veterans, and ex-militants (depending on the results of the programme's monitoring and assessment of their wellbeing and educational development) will be directed towards choosing (depending on their capacities and education level) either to be part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and any relevant governmental department/ ministry, or to become integrated into the agricultural sector, the private-sector, industries, and handcrafts. Furthermore, the MoL supports veterans and ex-militants to apply for funding for their small sized projects (i.e., agricultural, industrial, construction, and economic development bank loans).

During the meeting, the MoL DDR focal point expressed the need to rehabilitate the several reintegration centres in Libya as well as the need for drug addiction and mental health & psychosocial support for ex-combatants and vulnerable populations. In addition, they also requested for further development of the 'National Project for Rehabilitation and Reintegration Database' to include up-to-date tracking/monitoring technologies to follow up on the progress of veterans and ex-militants (the MoL-DDR Focal Point cited the technology used by Nigerian authorities to track ex-Boko Haram militants). The issue of foreign ex-combatants (i.e., from Chad, Niger, and Sudan) was also discussed, specifically their repatriation and reintegration into their home communities.

The meetings with the GoL PVE focal points (LCTC, MoL, and MoFA) were positive despite the comments about the PVE report. However, it was most important to note that the GoL PVE focal points were keen to inform UNDP about their areas of interest for future cooperation.

8. LESSONS LEARNED

Considering the negative impact of the EU funded PVE report during the launch event (3rd October 2022) and the concerns shown by the LCTC leadership, parallel consultations with other GoL-PVE stakeholders may have flagged these concerns and obvious lack of consistency and cohesion at an earlier stage. There was a lack of communication between the LCTC and the relevant ministries, which led to subsequent confusion.

On the political front, it is evident that the LCTC lacks the necessary political wherewithal to garner the required influence within the government that is necessary for the successful implementation of such a project. For future initiatives it would be better to coordinate with other entities that have a direct line of communication with the current government (i.e., the Prime Minister's Office) as this would have provided the LCTC with the much-needed support.

9. FUTURE PLAN

During the reporting period, the perception and sensitivity of PVE as a subject became all too apparent, specifically during the launch of the EU funded SUSC-PVE report (3rd October 2022). Due to issues raised in the report the LCTC and the relevant line ministries insisted that these are removed before moving forward with any PVE related activity. This caused the postponement of the schedule 5-day PVE workshop, which was slated to take place in Tripoli, Libya in late October 2022.

Moving forward and assessing the recommendations from the PVE conference (from 10th to 12th October 2022 in Tunis, Tunisia), there are some thematic areas that donors can support, however, these activities should not be labelled 'PVE' as such. The issue of PVE can be covered essentially through peacebuilding, economic development, youth empowerment, social cohesion and related activities that can help reduce and prevent violent extremism.

10. COMMUNICATIONS

The following news articles covered the 'Emerging Trends in Violent Extremism and the Future of PVE in Libya' conference, which took place in Tunis, Tunisia from 10th to 12th October 2022.

COR at UNDP's Tunis Conference on Violent Extremism and Future of PVE in LibyaUNDP PVE Highlights

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: EXPENSES BY OUTPUT

Project Outputs	Total Budget	Expenses (31-Dec-2022)	Delivery(%)
Output 1 National PVE Strategy development	113,807	68,900	60%
Output 2 Mechanism linking PVE	20,000	0	0[2]
Output 3 Coordination mechanism	84,143	16,100	19%
Unprogrammed budget	82,050	0	0
Grand Total	**300,000**	**85,000**	**28%**

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[2] Funds were not utilized due to the postponement of the five-day National PVE Strategy workshop, which was planned to take place at the end of October 2022.

ANNEX 2: RISK LOG

A project that aims to build national capacities to prevent VE in a country emerging from a protracted conflict and currently undergoing a political transition must overcome a vast range of barriers and risks. Successful implementation of activities and achievement of outputs and outcomes relies on a well-elaborated plan but much more importantly; it relies on strong partnerships, financial and political commitment, and access to the right expertise at the right point in time. This table presents some of the most pertinent risks and how the project partners intend to manage these risks.

Description	Consequence	Type	Initial risk	Countermeasures / Management response	Residual risk	Status (baseline Dec 2022)
1.Failure to mobilize sustained buy-in from national and local authorities, which would undermine the effectiveness of implementation and coordination.	Failure to foster buy- in and engagement of local authorities will hamper the coordination of the relevant stakeholders and the implementation of the project.	Political	I=2, P=3	Close liaison and ongoing engagement with local authorities and community groups to ensure government buy-in.	I =3, P = 4 I=3 P=2	Disagreement about specific contents of PVE report elicited government requests to remove contents before further implementation of project can commence.
2.Project achievements are annulled following the upcoming and future political transitions, and/or the legitimacy of current government institutions are diminished in the eyes of the public through postponement of elections.	Failure to adopt national PVE strategy and action plan due to change in political actors and/ or environment.	Political	I=3 P=3	Attention is paid to consulting a diverse range of actors, and a solid network of partnerships is created around the project to reduce the risk of abandonment. Through partnering with the LCTC, a bureaucratic institution that continues its work and remains relatively stable regardless of the high-level political leadership at its helm.		Elections not held therefore no change in the political leadership/ environment. However, the relatively weak status of the LCTC within the current political dispensation has revealed them to be ineffective.

3. Politicization of the PVE agenda, resulting in: Its instrumentalization aimed at limiting space for political opposition and/or civil society by national or local authorities (and/or leading to unintentional consequences in this regard) -The project as a whole or its initiatives are rejected by important stakeholders due to perceptions of political polarization.	National PVE strategy and action plan used to target political opponents and to silence opposing views.	Political	I = 3, P = 3	UNDP will seek to encourage a technocratic rather than political approach to developing a PVE strategy and action plan through providing technical guidance aimed at incorporating best practices and lessons learned from other contexts. UNDP will similarly encourage national and local authorities to adopt an inclusive approach from the beginning of the process to ensure that diverse perspectives are included early in the strategic planning. The project will put a strong emphasis on continuous monitoring and evaluation of national and local PVE frameworks to enable Libyan partners to be able to identify to negative unintended consequences and react accordingly. The project will avoid involving controversial personalities and profiles that risk contributing to perceptions of the politicization of the project.	I=3, P=3	PVE was not politicized during the implementation period.
4. Social stigma and danger of engaging in PVE activities often deter key actors from connecting with vulnerable youths within a socially and economically challenged context	Key actors and beneficiaries fail to interact thus adversely affecting the progress of the project	Security	I = 3, P = 3	The project will create mediums and mechanisms (for a) that build the confidence and facilitate the full engagement of potential key PVE actors, both nationally and locally	I=1, P=1	No issues encountered.
5. Lack of coordination, integration and alignment with similar initiatives that work toward the same overall objective may subsequently lead to a stand-alone project with no real wider (i.e., national) impact.	National PVE strategy not in line with current political trend in the country	Strategic	I = 3, P = 4	Support in the strategic deployment of knowledge transfer, enhanced coordination, and information analysis (i.e., thematic experts) to build capacities across national and local level lines. UNDP Libya will also continue its ongoing support to the national unification and broader Libyan political process to mitigate against potential further political divisions which may undermine strategic coordination across the country.	I=3, P=4	No issues encountered. However,

| 6. Failure to find required technical expertise nationally in Libya on PVE and the pillars of the National PVE Strategy | Unable to garner national expertise required to develop and implement strategy | Operational | I = 3, P = 3 | The project will seek required experts both in Libya and among the Libyan diasporas.

The project will also look regionally in North Africa to find experts that have the need technical expertise and experience and know the culture and language.

The project will ensure that commissioned international experts consolidate and transfer knowledge to the Libyan national context through providing capacity building to key stakeholders and through developing procedures and guidelines that will support the implementation of the PVE action plans in the longer term. | I=3, P=3 | The local CSOs engaged by the complementing EU funded SUSC-PVE project needed significant training and coaching on how to manage and implement a project. This was provided to them through another UN agency (i.e., UNITAR). This caused some delays in during the implementation of the project |